CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1162
12 August 1992

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES AGREED ON DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING HELD BY PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN IN WASHINGTON, D.C. IN JUNE 1992*

I have the honour to forward to you the attached documents relating to arms control and disarmament issues agreed on during the Summit Meeting held by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in Washington, D.C. in June 1992:

- A Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship;
- Joint Understanding (on further reductions in strategic offensive arms);
- Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons;
- Joint Russia-United States Statement on Korean Nuclear Non-proliferation;
- Joint Statement on a Global Protection System;
- Joint Russian-American Declaration on Defence Conversion;
- Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation;
- Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons through the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training;

---

* The official Russian texts of the above-mentioned documents are to be found in CD/1166.

GE.92-62608/4785B (E)

- Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons through the Provision of Armoured Blankets; and

- Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Material through the Provision of Fissile Material Containers.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference. It is my understanding that Ambassador Batsanov, Head of the Russian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, would plan to submit to you the Russian language version of these documents.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Conference on Disarmament

17 June 1992

A CHARTER FOR AMERICAN-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Striving to provide a solid and enduring basis for American-Russian relations of partnership and friendship;

Believing that the advancement of the well-being, prosperity, and security of a democratic Russian Federation and the United States of America are vitally interrelated;

Declaring their determination to observe strictly democratic principles and practices, including the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities;

Recognizing the importance of the rights of the individual in building a just and prosperous society;

Reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and subsequent CSCE documents;

Desiring to build a democratic peace that unites the entire community of democratic nations;

Noting their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security;

Wishing to promote the development of free markets, economic recovery and growth, and closer economic cooperation, trade, and investment;

Have established the following Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship:

DEMOCRACY AND PARTNERSHIP

The United States of America and the Russian Federation reaffirm their commitment to the ideals of democracy, to the primacy of the rule of law, and to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States of America fully supports the Russian Federation's efforts to build a democratic State and society founded on the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights. Beginning with mutual trust and respect as the basis for their relations, they are developing relations of partnership and friendship.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will cooperate closely in the international arena in the interest of advancing and defending common democratic values and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation intend to expand and intensify a comprehensive dialogue at various levels on both bilateral and international issues.

Given the crucial importance of contacts between the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation for defining the basic directions of bilateral relations and also in terms of global cooperation and stability, Summit meetings will be held on a regular basis.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation express their determination to promote confidence and enhance understanding between their peoples. They proceed on the assumption that an expansion of contacts between citizens will help ensure the irreversibility of the new quality of American-Russian relations.

For this purpose, they intend to facilitate the establishment of direct contacts between citizens and political, social, labour, religious and other organizations.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation are prepared to facilitate the work of each other's diplomats, journalists, businessmen, scientists, and other citizens by reaching agreement in opening their lands to travel, by lifting other travel restrictions, and by expanding their consulates.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation place particular emphasis on developing appropriate contacts between all levels of government - federal, regional, and local - and between private sector and voluntary organizations.

The United States of America intends to continue cooperation toward strengthening democratic institutions and a rule of law state in Russia, including developing an independent judiciary and institutionalizing guarantees for respect of individual rights.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The United States of America and the Russian Federation reiterate their determination to build a democratic peace, one founded on the twin pillars of political and economic freedom. The United States of America and the Russian Federation recognize the critical importance that democracy's success in Russia and the other former Soviet republics can have on international peace and security.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, proceeding from the basis of mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom and reaffirming the Camp David Declaration of February 1992, the November 1990 Charter of Paris, the December 1991, March 1992, and June 1992 communiqués of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the April 1992 communiqué of the Defence Ministers' Meeting, once again declare that they do not regard each other as adversaries and are developing relations of partnership and friendship.

Consistent with the United Nations Charter and other treaty obligations, the United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm their commitments to settle disputes between them by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other.

Beginning on the basis of their shared democratic values, the United States of America and the Russian Federation will unite in their efforts toward strengthening international peace and security, preventing and settling regional conflicts, and solving global problems.

While working toward a democratic peace, the United States of America and the Russian Federation realize that the end of the cold war has not meant the end of insecurity and conflict in Europe. Ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and international rivalries already threaten to turn an opportunity for peace into yet another phase of European turmoil.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation reaffirm their respect for the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE-participating States, including the new independent States, and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means, in accordance with the rules of international law and the principles of CSCE.

Like the other nations of the Euro-Atlantic Community, the United States of America and the Russian Federation cannot accept another phase of European instability. They therefore intend to lend both support and leadership to the effort to spare this community further tragedies like that which has befallen the peoples of Yugoslavia. The need is clear: International means of collective engagement must be devised and strengthened to help prevent conflicts by addressing their root causes, to help resolve disputes before they become violent, to help mediate an end to conflicts wherever they occur, and to help keep the peace once it is established.

Therefore, mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and settlement and European peace-keeping capabilities must be strengthened if we are to adequately cope with future conflicts. To this end, the United States of America and the Russian Federation support the following initiatives:

The creation of a CSCE special representative to help strengthen efforts to address ethnic antagonisms and the treatment of minorities.

The strengthening of means within CSCE to provide for more effective international dispute prevention, management, and settlement.

The creation of a credible Euro-Atlantic peace-keeping capability, based on CSCE political authority, which allows for the use of the capacities of NACC, NATO, and WEU to prepare, support, and manage operations for CSCE as well as allows for the contribution of forces and resources from any and all CSCE States.

With the security of North America and Europe inseparable, the United States of America and the Russian Federation support the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Community, believing that security is indivisible from

Vancouver to Vladivostok. The parties share a vision of such a Euro-Atlantic Community as being open to cooperation with all democratic societies. A prominent role for institutions like NACC, NATO, and WEU along with CSCE contributes uniquely to Euro-Atlantic security. The potential of other institutions and mechanisms, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, in support of security and peace in the area is also noted.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation believe that strengthening confidence and stability in Asia and the Pacific region in cooperation with other States will also promote global security. The parties are prepared to cooperate on these goals. They aim at a fuller utilization of the potential of economic-commercial cooperation in this region of the world, particularly in view of the geographic positions of the United States of America and Russia.

Noting the progress in the resolution of long-standing conflicts, promotion of democracy and human rights, and advancement of economic freedom and prosperity in vast areas of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the United States of America and the Russian Federation stress the necessity to continue this process. Both sides are ready to contribute to tapping the new potential for peace, to putting an end to conflicts, to bolstering mutual confidence and trust, and to enhancing democracy - which forms the basis of an enduring peace in all parts of the world.

With the aim of coordinating crisis prevention activities, the United States of America and the Russian Federation recognize the critical importance of maintaining open lines of communication and exchange. The United States of America and the Russian Federation recognize the importance of the United Nations Security Council and intend to maintain communications with other members of the Security Council to prevent, manage, and resolve crises. The United States and the Russian Federation recognize the prominent role of the United Nations in solving major international problems. They welcome in particular the contribution of the United Nations to peace and security, including the strengthening of United Nations peace-keeping.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation are prepared to work together toward further arms control and disarmament with the aim of promoting stability through implementation with all countries involved of the treaties on conventional forces in Europe and on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and by carrying out respective United States and Russian unilateral and complementary nuclear initiatives. They are committed to discuss further steps which might improve stability and result in further reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons, the global elimination of chemical weapons, and the promotion of confidence-building and crisis prevention measures.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation are prepared to cooperate in the matter of eliminating nuclear warheads and chemical weapons subject to destruction within the framework of treaty obligations and unilateral and complementary initiatives.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation believe that non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a critical priority. Both parties will work towards strengthening and improving the non-proliferation regimes of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; of missiles and missile technology; as well as of destabilizing conventional weapons in accordance with international rules and agreements.

In this regard, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, in a separate statement, have expressed their determination to cooperate in exploring the potential to create a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Centre and to cooperate in the development of ballistic missile defence capabilities and technologies.

In view of the potential for building a strategic partnership between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the parties intend to accelerate defence cooperation between their military establishments including: intensifying contacts at all levels; expanding activities that encourage doctrinal and operational openness; establishing expanded exchange and liaison programmes; exchanging ideas on fostering proper civil-military relations in a democratic society. The parties will also pursue cooperation in peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics missions.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation intend to accelerate joint work on the conversion of defence industries to civilian production.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this seventeenth day of June 1992, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

17 June 1992

JOINT UNDERSTANDING

The President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation have agreed to substantial further reductions in strategic offensive arms. Specifically, the two sides have agreed upon and will promptly conclude a Treaty with the following provisions:

Within the seven-year period following entry into force of the START Treaty, they will reduce their strategic forces to no more than:

- An overall total number of warheads for each between 3,800 and 4,250 (as each nation shall determine) or such lower number as each nation shall decide.

- 1,200 MIRVed ICBM warheads.

- 650 heavy ICBM warheads.

- 2,160 SLBM warheads.

By the year 2003 (or by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia), they will:

- Reduce the overall total to no more than a number of warheads for each between 3,000 and 3,500 (as each nation shall determine) or such lower number as each nation shall decide.

- Eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs.

- Reduce SLBM warheads to no more than 1,750.

For the purpose of calculating the overall totals described above:

The number of warheads counted for heavy bombers with nuclear roles will be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry.

Under agreed procedures, heavy bombers not to exceed 100 that were never equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and that are reoriented to conventional roles will not count against the overall total established by this agreement.

- Such heavy bombers will be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles.

- No nuclear weapons will be located at bases for heavy bombers with conventional roles.

- Such aircraft and crews will not train or exercise for nuclear missions.

- Current inspection procedures already agreed in the START Treaty will help affirm that these bombers have conventional roles. No new verification procedures are required.

- Except as otherwise agreed, these bombers will remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

The reductions required by this agreement will be carried out by eliminating missile launchers and heavy bombers using START procedures, and, in accordance with the plans of the two sides, by reducing the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles other than the SS-18. Except as otherwise agreed, ballistic missile warheads will be calculated according to START counting rules.

The two Presidents directed that this agreement be promptly recorded in a brief Treaty document which they will sign and submit for ratification in their respective countries. Because this new agreement is separate from but builds upon the START Treaty, they continue to urge that the START Treaty be ratified and implemented as soon as possible.

For the United States of America:

(Signed): George Bush

For the Russian Federation:

(Signed): Boris Yeltsin

17 June 1992

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

President Bush and President Yeltsin stressed their continuing commitment to the global elimination of chemical weapons. They expressed their conviction that the Geneva negotiations on a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons can be concluded by the end of August. They agreed to instruct their representatives accordingly, and called on all participants in the negotiations to do their utmost to achieve this goal. They expressed the hope that a ministerial meeting could be convened in that time-frame to approve the convention.

The two leaders underscored their support for the 1989 Wyoming Joint Memorandum on phased confidence-building measures in the area of chemical weapons destruction, and agreed to implement the new, cooperative provisions for detailed data exchanges and inspections included in the Joint Memorandum as soon as arrangements can be completed. They also agreed that the June 1990 bilateral chemical weapons Destruction Agreement would be updated and brought into force promptly.

17 June 1992

JOINT RUSSIA-UNITED STATES STATEMENT
ON KOREAN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Russia and the United States, supporting the efforts by the international community to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, note the positive changes in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in Korea. They applaud the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 31 December 1991, and call for the full implementation of this agreement, which will make an essential contribution to strengthening regional peace and security and to reconciliation and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The sides welcome the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ratification of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and encourage further cooperation with the agency in placing its nuclear facilities under appropriate safeguards. Full compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty and the Joint Declaration, including IAEA safeguards as well as credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspections, will make possible the full resolution of international concerns over the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula.

17 June 1992

JOINT STATEMENT ON A GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM

The Presidents continued their discussion of the potential benefits of a global protection system (GPS) against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is important to explore the role for defences in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. The two Presidents agreed that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested States in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation would be a tangible expression of the new relationship that exists between Russia and the United States and would involve them in an important undertaking with other nations of the world community.

The two Presidents agreed it is necessary to start work without delay to develop the concept of the GPS. For this purpose they agreed to establish a high-level group to explore on a priority basis the following practical steps:

- The potential for sharing of early warning information through the establishment of an early warning centre.

- The potential for cooperation with participating States in developing ballistic missile defence capabilities and technologies.

- The development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement the global protection system.

17 June 1992

JOINT RUSSIAN-AMERICAN DECLARATION ON DEFENCE CONVERSION

The United States of America and the Russian Federation recognize that defence conversion is a key challenge of the post Cold War era and essential for building a democratic peace. Both parties realize the hardships involved in defence conversion efforts. But the parties realize, too, that the successful conversion of resources no longer needed for defence is in the long-term economic and national security interests of their peoples. Therefore, the United States of America and the Russian Federation declare their intention to devote priority to cooperation in advancing defence conversion.

Recognizing the important role of the private sector and of practical participation by business communities in the complex task of defence conversion, the United States of America and the Russian Federation are establishing a United States-Russian Defence Conversion Committee to facilitate conversion through expanded trade and investment. The intergovernmental committee will be established within the framework of the United States-Russian Business Development Committee and will be designed to facilitate the exchange of information and the promotion of trade and investment, including through the development of contacts between interested groups, the expansion of information exchange on enterprises undergoing conversion, and, the improvement of conditions for commercial activities in both countries through the identification and removal of obstacles to expanded trade and investment. The Committee will inform the Governments of both countries on a regular basis of the results of its activities, in order that they may take timely and effective measures to eliminate impediments to bilateral cooperation in the area of conversion.

With the aim of promoting successful cooperation in conversion, each of the parties intends to take a number of practical steps in the near future.

The Russian Federation intends to establish on its territory a favourable political, economic, legal and regulatory climate for American trade and investment, including the adoption of macroeconomic reforms necessary to institute convertibility of the rouble; the pursuit of complementary microeconomic reforms to support the privatization and demonopolization of industry; the enactment of laws to guarantee contract and property rights; and, the dissemination of internationally accepted standards of basic business and financial information on enterprises undergoing conversion.

The United States intends to facilitate United States business engagement in commercially viable conversion projects in Russia, including joint ventures, through the placement of long-term defence conversion resident advisers to serve as catalysts for United States business engagement and to provide expertise to local leaders and enterprise directors; the establishment in Russia of business centres with translation, education and training facilities for United States businesses operating in Russia; the creation of a business information service ("BISNIS") in Washington to match businesses in Russia with potential investors in the United States; and, the involvement of the

Trade and Development Programme, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank to provide incentives to American private investment in commercially viable defence conversion projects.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation endorse the COCOM Cooperation Forum on Export Control as a means to heal Cold War divisions and advance conversion through helping to remove barriers to high-technology trade, assisting in the establishment of COCOM-comparable export control regimes in Russia and the other new independent States, and establishing procedures to ensure the civil end-use of sensitive goods and technologies on matters of common concern. Both parties agree that this process is based on their mutual determination strictly to adhere to world standards of export controls in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, missiles and missile technology, destabilizing conventional armaments, and dual-use goods and technologies.

The parties strongly encourage the expansion of bilateral defence and military contacts and the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in addressing the full range of military issues that are critically linked to the success of conversion including civilian control of the military in a democracy; defence planning, budgeting and procurement in a market economy; base closings and conversions; and demobilization and retraining as well as social protection.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS AND THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

The United States of America and the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons in the Russian Federation in connection with their destruction,

Intending to build upon the framework for cooperation set forth in the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation to Facilitate the Provision of Assistance of 4 April 1992,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties shall cooperate in order to assist the Russian Federation in achieving the following objectives:

(a) the destruction of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;

(b) the safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and

(c) the establishment of additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons that pose a risk of proliferation.

ARTICLE II

1. The Parties, through their Executive Agents, shall enter into implementing agreements as appropriate to accomplish the objectives set forth in Article I of this Agreement. The implementing agreements shall include, inter alia:

(a) a description of the activities to be undertaken;

(b) provisions concerning the sequence of activities;

(c) provisions concerning access to material, training or services provided at sites of their use, if possible, for monitoring and inspection; and

(d) other provisions as appropriate.

2. In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any implementing agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE III

Each Party shall designate an Executive Agent to implement this Agreement. For the United States of America, the Executive Agent shall be the Department of Defense. For the Russian Federation, with respect to nuclear weapons, the Executive Agent shall be the Ministry of Atomic Energy.

ARTICLE IV

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or in an implementing agreement, the terms of this Agreement shall apply to all material, training or services provided in accordance with this Agreement or implementing agreements, and to all related activities and personnel.

ARTICLE V

1. The Russian Federation shall facilitate the entry and exit of employees of the Government of the United States of America and contractor personnel of the United States of America into and out of the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of carrying out activities in accordance with this Agreement.

2. Aircraft and vessels, other than regularly scheduled commercial aircraft and vessels, used by the United States of America in connection with activities pursuant to this Agreement in the Russian Federation shall, in accordance with international law, be free of customs inspections, customs charges, landing fees, navigation charges, port charges, tolls, and any other charges by the Russian Federation or any of its instrumentalities.

3. If an aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial aircraft is used by the United States of America for transportation to the Russian Federation, its flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft, including in the remarks section of the flight plan confirmation that the appropriate clearance has been obtained. The Russian Federation shall provide parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for aircraft of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

Unless the written consent of the United States of America has first been obtained, the Russian Federation shall not transfer title to, or possession of, any material, training or services provided pursuant to this Agreement to any entity, other than on officer, employee or agent of a Party to this Agreement and shall not permit the use of such material, training or services for purposes other than those for which it has been furnished.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Russian Federation shall, in respect of legal proceedings and claims, other than contractual claims, hold harmless and bring no legal proceedings against the United States of America and personnel, contractors,

and contractors' personnel of the United States of America, for damage to property owned by the Russian Federation, or death or injury to any personnel of the Russian Federation, arising out of activities pursuant to this Agreement.

2. Claims by third parties, arising out of the acts or omissions of any employees of the United States of America or contractors or contractors' personnel of the United States of America done in the performance of official duty, shall be the responsibility of the Russian Federation.

3. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the Parties from providing compensation in accordance with their national laws.

4. The Parties may consult, as appropriate, on claims and proceedings under this Article.

5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent legal proceedings or claims against nationals of the Russian Federation or permanent residents of the Russian Federation.

ARTICLE VIII

The activities of the United States of America under this Ageement are subject to availability of appropriated funds.

ARTICLE IX

Employees of the Government of the United States of America present in the territory of the Russian Federation for activities related to this Agreement shall be accorded privileges and immunities equivalent to that accorded administrative and technical staff personnel in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.

ARTICLE X

1. The United States of America, its personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar charge by the Russian Federation or any of its instrumentalities on activities undertaken in accordance with this Agreement.

2. The United States of America, its personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel may import into, and export out of, the Russian Federation any equipment, supplies, material or services required to implement this Agreement. Such importation and exportation of articles or services shall not be subject to any licence, other constrictions, customs, duties, taxes or any other charges or inspections by the Russian Federation or any of its instrumentalities.

ARTICLE XI

In the event that a Party awards contracts for the acquisition of articles and services, including construction, to implement this Agreement, such contracts shall be awarded in accordance with the laws and regulations of

that Party. Acquisition of articles and services in the Russian Federation by or on behalf of the United States of America in implementing this Agreement shall not be subject to any taxes, customs, duties or similar charges by the Russian Federation or its instrumentalities.

ARTICLE XII

The Russian Federation shall take all reasonable measures within its power to ensure the security of material, training or services provided pursuant to this Agreement and shall protect them against seizure or conversion.

ARTICLE XIII

Upon request, representatives of the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to examine the use of any material, training or other services provided in accordance with this Agreement, if possible at sites of their location or use, and shall have the right to inspect any and all related records or documentation during the period of this Agreement and for three years thereafter. These inspections shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon by the Parties.

ARTICLE XIV

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for seven years. This Agreement may be amended or extended by the written agreement of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon 90 days' written notification to the other Party of its intention to do so. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement or the implementing agreements, the obligations of the Russian Federation in accordance with Articles VI, VII, IX, X, XII of this Agreement shall continue to apply without respect to time, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Parties.

DONE at Washington this 17th day of June 1992, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

(Signed): George Bush

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

(Signed) Boris Yeltsin

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT AND RELATED TRAINING

The Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation in connection with the destruction of nuclear weapons and to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. In order to assist the Russian Federation in the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in connection with the expeditious destruction of nuclear weapons, the Department of Defense of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as DOD, shall provide at no cost to the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as MINATOM, the emergency nuclear weapon accident response equipment specified in Annex A, which is an integral part of this Agreement, together with related technical manuals. This equipment shall conform with the technical specifications established by the DOD.

2. The MINATOM shall use all material, training and services provided in accordance with this Agreement exclusively for the purpose of facilitating the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in connection with their destruction.

3. The DOD and the United States of America shall not be responsible for ensuring either the proper use of material, training or services provided in accordance with this Agreement or against any failure of the material, training or services to provide intended levels of protection.

4. This Agreement and all activities undertaken in accordance with this Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of 17 June 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification of the other Party, to delegate responsibilities for the implementation of this Agreement to other agencies, departments or units of their respective Governments.

2. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification of the other Party, to designate technical liaison representatives for material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The total cost of material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement and associated expenses, including costs related to the transportation of material and personnel to and from the Russian Federation, to the DOD shall not exceed $US 10 million.

2. Delivery of material and training pursuant to this Agreement shall commence within eight months after this Agreement shall enter into force.

3. The equipment to be provided pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered to Moscow, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The DOD shall notify MINATOM of the planned date of each shipment at least 72 hours in advance. The MINATOM shall take possession of the equipment within six hours after the receipt of the notification of the arrival of such shipment.

ARTICLE IV

The MINATOM shall examine all material received pursuant to this Agreement and provide confirmation to the DOD within ten days of receipt that it conforms with the specifications established by the DOD. Any material failing to conform with these specifications shall be returned to the United States of America through the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow within 30 days of receipt for replacement.

ARTICLE V

Upon 30 days' advance notice and no more than three times in each calendar year, representatives of the DOD shall have the right to examine the use of any material, training or other services provided in accordance with this Agreement, if possible at sites of their location or use, and shall have the right to inspect any and all related records or documentation during the period of this Agreement and for three years thereafter.

ARTICLE VI

1. The DOD shall provide the MINATOM with a set of technical manuals and initial operator training on the equipment in accordance with the terms of this Article. The delivery of the manuals and training shall be integrated, to the maximum extent feasible, with the delivery of the equipment such that the equipment may be operated safely as soon as practical after it is delivered.

2. The DOD may provide, in its discretion, training to the MINATOM representatives related to the operation of equipment provided pursuant to this Agreement in a maximum of five phases:

(a) A training programme review phase during which representatives of the MINATOM may have an opportunity to review the training programme and suggest modifications which address specific needs in the Russian Federation. This phase of training, if undertaken, would be conducted in the United States of America;

(b) An initial operator training phase during which personnel of the Russian Federation may be trained on the operation of equipment. This phase of training, if undertaken, would be conducted in the Russian Federation;

(c) A periodic review training phase. This phase of training, if undertaken, would be conducted in either the Russian Federation or the United States of America, as agreed by the Parties;

(d) An update training phase, as required by unforeseen circumstances or equipment modifications. This phase of training, if undertaken, would be conducted in either the Russian Federation or the United States of America, as agreed by the Parties;

(e) A maintenance and calibration training phase. This training may be provided by the DOD until such time as the representatives of the MINATOM have acquired sufficient familiarity with the equipment to assume responsibility for maintenance and calibration as described in this Agreement. This training, if undertaken, would be conducted in the Russian Federation.

ARTICLE VII

The DOD may provide, in its discretion, initial maintenance and calibration services, spare parts, and repair parts to the MINATOM for the operation of equipment provided pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

As appropriate, the Parties may enter into implementing arrangements to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such arrangements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for two years or for the duration of the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement, which ever is shorter. This Agreement may be amended or extended by the written agreement of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon 90 days written notification to the other Party of its intention to do so.

DONE at Washington D.C. this 17th day of June 1992, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Signed): Donald Atwood

FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

(Signed): A. Kozyrev

ANNEX A TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT AND RELATED TRAINING

Item description	Quantity
Communication equipment	
Saber I radio system	100
Protective clothing	
Various clothing sets	820
Survey instrumentation	
Violinist II Kits	100
Radiography	
High energy radiography	1
Video and optics	
Portable integrated video system (PIVS)	4
Fiberscope system	4
Access equipment	
Emergency access equipment	10
Liquid abrasive cutter	2
Computer network	
Laptop system	3
Stabilization system	
Silicon rubber/polyurethane Damaged weapon packaging/equipment module	3

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF ARMOURED BLANKETS

The Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation in connection with their destruction and to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. In order to assist the Russian Federation in the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons in connection with their expeditious destruction, the Department of Defense of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as DOD, shall provide at no cost to the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as MINATOM, armoured blankets, hereinafter referred to as blankets, as specified in Article VI of this Agreement.

2. The MINATOM shall use all material, training and services provided in accordance with this Agreement exclusively for the purpose of augmenting the protective capability of nuclear weapon containers and vehicles carrying nuclear weapons to and within destruction facilities and necessary related storage facilities.

3. The DOD and the United States of America shall not be responsible for ensuring either the proper use of material, training or services provided in accordance with this Agreement or against any failure of the material, training or services to provide intended levels of protection.

4. This Agreement and all activities undertaken in accordance with this Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of 17 June 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification to the other Party, to delegate responsibilities for the implementation of this Agreement to other agencies, departments or units of their respective governments.

2. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification to the other Party, to designate technical liaison representatives for material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The total cost of all material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement and associated expenses, including costs related to the transportation of material and personnel to and from the Russian Federation, to the DOD shall not exceed $US 5 million.

2. Delivery of blanekts pursuant to this Agrement shall commence as follows:

(a) for existing United States Army nylon blankets, up to 200 sets within 60 days after this Agreement enters into force; and

(b) for soft armour blankets, lots of 30-40 sets as they are produced with total delivery of up to 250 sets within one year after this Agreement enters into force.

3. The blankets shall be delivered to Moscow, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The DOD shall notify the MINATOM of the planned date of each shipment at least 72 hours in advance. The MINATOM shall take possession of the blankets within six hours after the receipt of the notification of the arrival of such blankets.

ARTICLE IV

The MINATOM shall examine all blankets received pursuant to this Agreement and provide confirmation to the DOD within ten days of receipt that they conform with the technical characteristics and specifications set forth in Article VI of this Agreement. Any blankets failing to conform with these standards shall be returned to the United States of America through the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow within 30 days of receipt for replacement.

ARTICLE V

Upon 30 days' advance notice and no more than three times in each calendar year, representatives of the DOD shall have the right to examine the use of any material, training or other services provided in accordance with this Agreement, if possible at sites of their location or use, and shall have the right to inspect any and all related records or documentation during the period of this Agreement and for three years thereafter.

ARTICLE VI

Blankets provided to the MINATOM pursuant to this Agreement shall conform to the standards listed in the following categories:

(a) Up to 250 soft armour blankets, to be manufactured, each consisting of ten identical 2 m x 1 m all-purpose panels with eyelets and velcro fasteners that can be assembled into blankets for various size nuclear weapon containers and designed to be capable of protecting such containers against damage by 9.00 mm Makarov-pistol bullets and hand grenade fragments; and

(b) Up to 200 existing sets of United States Army nylon armour blankets, each consisting of six panels, 1.52 metres x 1.04 metres in size and designed to be capable of protecting nuclear weapon containers against damage by 9.00 mm Makarov-pistol bullets and hand grenade fragments.

ARTICLE VII

The DOD may provide, in its discretion, training to the MINATOM related to the use of material provided in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

As appropriate, the Parties may enter into implementing arrangements to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such arrangements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for two years or for the duration of the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement, whichever is shorter. This Agreement may be amended or extended by the written agreement of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon 90 days written notification to the other Party of its intention to do so.

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 17th day of June 1992, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Signed): Donald Atwood

FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

(Signed): A. Kozyrev

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL THROUGH THE PROVISION OF FISSILE MATERIAL CONTAINERS

The Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material in the Russian Federation in connection with the destruction of nuclear weapons and to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. In order to assist the Russian Federation in the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material in connection with the expeditious destruction of nuclear weapons, the Department of Defense of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as DOD, shall provide at no cost to the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the MINATOM, fissile material containers, hereinafter referred to as the containers, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and conforming with technical specifications established by the DOD. In establishing these technical specifications, the DOD shall take into account the recommendations of the MINATOM and the results of technical discussions between the Parties. Additional procedures and requirements related to the provision of the containers are specified in Annex A, which is an integral part of this Agreement.

2. The MINATOM shall use all material, training and services provided in accordance with this Agreement exclusively for the purpose of providing protective transport and storage of fissile material in connection with the expeditious destruction of nuclear weapons.

3. The DOD and the United States of America shall not be responsible for ensuring either the proper use of material, training or services provided in accordance with this Agreement or against any failure of the material, training or services to provide intended levels of protection.

4. This Agreement and all activities undertaken in accordance with this Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of 17 June 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification to the other Party, to delegate responsibilities for the implementation of this Agreement to other agencies, departments or units of their respective governments.

2. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right, following written notification to the other Party, to designate technical liaison representatives for material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The total cost of all material, training and services provided pursuant to this Agreement and associated expenses, including costs related to the transportation of material and personnel to and from the Russian Federation, to the DOD shall not exceed US$ 50 million.

2. The DOD shall initially deliver up to ten thousand containers to the MINATOM pursuant to this Agreement. The non-binding target date for completion of the delivery of these containers is 31 December 1995. The DOD may, at its discretion, increase the number of containers to be delivered pursuant to this Agreement, provided that the total cost of such additional containers and related services and training does not exceed US$ 50 million.

3. The equipment to be provided pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered to Moscow, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The DOD shall notify the MINATOM of the planned date of each shipment at least seven days in advance of the anticipated shipping date. The MINATOM shall take possession of the containers within six hours after receipt of the notification of the arrival of such containers.

ARTICLE IV

The MINATOM shall examine all containers received purusant to this Agreement and provide confirmation to the DOD within ten days of receipt that they conform with the technical specifications established by the DOD. Damaged containers and material failing to conform with agreed specifications shall be returned to the United States of America through the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow within 30 days of receipt for replacement.

ARTICLE V

Upon 30 days' advance notice and no more than three times in each calendar year, representatives of the DOD shall have the right to examine the use of any material, training or other services provided in accordance with this Agreement, if possible at sites of their location or use, and shall have the right to inspect any and all related records or documentation during the period of this Agreement and for three years thereafter.

ARTICLE VI

As appropriate, the Parties may enter into implementing arrangements to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such arrangements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for four years or for the duration of the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement, whichever is shorter. This Agreement may be amended or extended by the written agreement of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party upon ninety days written notification to the other Party of its intention to do so.

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 17th day of June, 1992, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

(Signed): Donald Atwood

FOR THE MINISTRY OF
ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

(Signed): A. Kozyrev

ANNEX A TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL THROUGH THE PROVISION OF FISSILE MATERIAL CONTAINERS

ARTICLE I

Within 30 days of the entry into force of this Agreement, the MINATOM shall provide a document, in Russian and English, to the DOD which fully describes design requirements recommended by the MINATOM for the containers. This document shall include the following information: vibration input environments; permissible vibration levels in the inner vessel; acceptable leak rate levels of the inner vessel in all environments; requirements not defined by the International Atomic Energy Safety Series No. 6; and other design requirements. This document shall constitute only a MINATOM recommendation and the DOD shall, to the maximum extent practical, use it in the design of containers to be provided to the MINATOM.

ARTICLE II

1. Within 60 days of the entry into force of this Agreement, the DOD shall provide to the MINATOM, for information purposes only, cost estimates and a schedule for the design, qualification and production activities for ten thousand containers, designated as the AT400R. These scheduled activities shall include: a test plan for the qualification tests which shall ensure compliance with DOD design requirements; identification of witness points for the MINATOM technical experts to observe the qualification tests; development of operating procedures for the use of the AT400R container; and, preparation of acceptance test plans, to include witness points for the MINATOM technical experts.

2. When available, the DOD shall provide to the MINATOM designs, specifications, and reports detailing the results of analysis and tests of the AT400R containers' mechanical and thermal performance in normal and accident situations or environments.

ARTICLE III

DOD may, in its discretion and in accordance with Article I of this Annex, invite the MINATOM technical experts to the United States of America or other locations to witness qualification and acceptance tests for the containers. The costs associated with these observation activities shall be borne by the DOD; the number of the MINATOM experts shall be determined by the DOD after consultation with the MINATOM.

ARTICLE IV

The DOD shall prepare and provide to the MINATOM operating specifications for the containers. The DOD may provide, at its discretion, training and supplementary materials and services to the MINATOM in order to carry out the purposes of this agreement.

ARTICLE V

The DOD shall not be responsible for payment of expenses related to the construction procedures or modification of containers that are not required for conformance with the DOD standards and specifications for containers provided pursuant to this Agreement.